Finally, Kuhn uses ‘paradigm’ in a more **concrete** way still, as **an actual textbook or classic work** (p. 10), as **supplying tools** (pp. 37 and 76), as **actual instrumentation** (pp. 59 and 60); more linguistically, as **a grammatical paradigm** (p. 23), illustratively, as **an analogy** (e.g. on p. 14); and more psychologically, as a **gestalt-figure and as an anomalous pack of cards** (pp. 63 and 85). I shall call paradigms of this last sort artefact paradigms or construct paradigms.

Kuhn’s second main sense of paradigm, however, which is given by another group of uses, is a sociological sense. Thus he defines ‘paradigm’ as **a universally recognized scientific achievement** (p. x), as a concrete scientific achievement (pp. lo-ii), as **like a set of political institutions** (p. 91), and as like also to **an accepted judicial decision** (p. 23). I shall call paradigms of this sociological sort sociological paradigms.

For when \[Kuhn] equates ‘paradigm’ with a set of beliefs (p. 4), with a myth (p. 2), with a successful metaphysical speculation (p. 17), with **a. standard** (p. 102), with **a new way of seeing** (pp. 117-21), with **an organizing principle** governing perception itself, (p. 120), with **a map** (p. 108), and with something which determines a large area of reality (p. 128), it is clearly a metaphysical notion or entity, rather than a scientific one, which he has in his mind. > – Margaret Masterman, [[Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge - Lakatos]], p. 65

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